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Abstract
We revisit the seminal paper on endogenous fertility by Barro and
Becker (1989) taking into account households’ heterogeneity in terms of
capital endowments, mortality differential and cost per surviving child.
Focusing on an endogenous growth version, we show at first that there
exists a unique balanced growth path (BGP) where the population growth
rates of all dynasties are identical. Then, we study the long-run effects of
shocks on mortality rates (such as epidemics), mortality differential and
total factor productivity (TFP) on the economic and demographic growth
rates. The main mechanism rests on the adjustment of the average rearing
cost of a surviving child. Finally, we extend the model considering the
effects of labor taxation. We find that a higher tax rate may, on the one
side, enhance growth but, on the other side, raise wealth inequalities.
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1 Introduction
Barro and Becker (1989) have pioneered the optimal growth literature with
endogenous demography and provided a popular framework to represent the
interplay between economic and demographic dynamics. As claimed by these
authors, they have extended ”the literature on optimal economic growth [...]
to allow for endogenous and optimizing choices of population growth and in-
tergenerational transfers.” In this paper, we want to go one step further, by
encompassing households’ heterogeneity, specified as heterogeneous capital en-
dowments, mortality rates and costs of rearing children.
We also depart from Barro and Becker (1989) revisiting their contribution
in a model of endogenous growth. Indeed, considering dynamics along a bal-
anced growth path (BGP) allows us to highlights the role of shocks on mortality
rates (such as epidemics), mortality differential (such as health reforms), total
factor productivity (such as industrial revolutions) on economic and popula-
tion growth. In addition, endogenous growth is also suitable to understand the
policy implications, namely the effects of labor taxation, on the growth rates,
wealth inequalities and social welfare.
Our model is connected with two streams of literature. On the one hand,
some contributions, that introduce heterogeneous households and borrowing
constraints in the Ramsey (1928) model, characterize the resulting stationary
capital distribution and study how the convergence to the steady state takes
place.1 We depart from these works by considering the fertility choices: endoge-
nous fertility is in fact a way to introduce endogenous discounting. Moreover,
we pay attention to the properties of the BGP.
On the other hand, a second stream of literature encompasses endogenous
fertility in growth models to study the interaction between economic and de-
mographic growth.2 In recent years, this topic has been enriched taking into
account households’ heterogeneity to study the links between demographic tran-
sition, inequality and growth.3 To the best of our knowledge, surprisingly, no
effort has been made to include agents’ heterogeneity in the seminal work by
Barro and Becker (1989) to understand the trade-off between inequality and
growth, either economic or demographic. What we can learn about inequality
and growth from this benchmark is the focal point and the aim of the paper.4
In the spirit of Doepke (2005), we introduce survival probabilities in the
Barro and Becker (1989) framework, that can be interpreted as shares of surviv-
ing children. Following Becker (1980), we consider also borrowing constraints to
avoid negative bequests. This assumption does not matter in presence of a rep-
resentative household, but becomes crucial when dynasties are heterogeneous,
and prevents deviant behaviors of individuals overburdened with debt.
1See Becker (1980) for a seminal contribution and Becker (2006) for an extensive survey of
this literature.
2See Nerlove and Raut (1997) for an introductory survey.
3See, among others, de la Croix and Doepke (2003), de la Croix and Sommacal (2009) and
Dahan and Tsiddon (1998).
4However, following Galor (2005) who argues that the Barro and Becker (1989) model is
not suitable to study transitions in the very long-run, we ignore this issue.
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For simplicity and tractability, we consider only two heterogeneous dynas-
ties, but heterogeneity is threefold: capital endowments, survival probabilities
and time costs of having children. The assumption of heterogeneous survival
probabilities implies a mortality differential. Moreover, the time cost of rearing
children will be often specified as an affine function of the survival probability
(as in Doepke (2005)). In this case, the mortality differential accounts also for
the heterogeneity in the costs of children.
To allow for endogenous growth, we assume that production benefits from
knowledge externalities that depend on capital intensity. This specification of
externalities was pioneered by Frankel (1962), a paper rarely quoted.
We start the BGP characterization, by showing that the borrowing con-
straints are never binding and so, everybody holds capital along the BGP. Then,
we prove the existence and the uniqueness of the BGP. In addition, studying
local dynamics, we find the equilibrium determinacy: the jump variables adjust
as usual in the basic models of endogenous growth and growth is balanced from
the beginning, i.e. there is no room for transitional dynamics. An interesting
feature of our model is that, even if agents are heterogeneous, each dynasty
experience the same demographic growth rate along the BGP and any fertility
differential is ruled out, in contrast with the relative decline of a subpopulation
found in de la Croix and Doepke (2003).
Two key mechanisms work along the BGP and account for the behavior of
the model. On the one side, we observe a positive relationship between the aver-
age cost per surviving child and economic growth; on the other side, a negative
link between economic and demographic growth. Both of them can be explained
on the ground of the quantity-quality trade-off of rearing children. Following
an increase in the cost per surviving children, households would like to have
less children, but making higher bequests, which promotes capital accumula-
tion. This slows down the population growth, while enhancing the economic
growth. We show that the average cost per surviving child is increasing in the
mortality rates of both types of households as well as in the mortality differen-
tial. As a consequence, an increase in the mortality rate of one or all the agents,
due for instance to epidemics, promotes economic growth, while it pushes down
population dynamics. The same happens when the mortality differential be-
comes larger: economies with more dispersed mortality rates due, for example,
to a more unequal access to health services and medical care, experience higher
economic growth rates. De la Croix and Sommacal (2009) reach a similar conclu-
sion in a model without endogenous fertility, where the mortality rates depend
on medical knowledge. Of course, the mechanism to explain the positive link
between mortality differential and economic growth, is different in our paper.
Finally, we extend the model considering labor income taxation. We in-
vestigate whether economies experiencing smaller mortality rates or a lower
mortality differential, due for instance to a more equal access to medical care,
should always cut their tax rates to enhance economic growth and reduce their
gap with respect to economies with higher mortality rates or larger mortality
differential. We argue that increasing the tax rate on labor income has two
opposite effects on economic growth. Indeed, on the one hand, it reduces in-
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come, which implies in turn a lower number of children and a higher rate of
economic growth, due to the quantity-quality trade-off. On the other hand, it
cuts down the time cost of rearing children, which induces households to have
more children with a negative impact on economic growth. Therefore, even if
public spending is not productive (Barro (1990)) or does not enter households’
preferences, we may have a non-monotonic relationship between tax rate and
growth. There are also configurations of fundamentals where a higher tax rate
always promotes economic growth. In these cases, however, wealth inequali-
ties increase and a positive relation between growth and inequalities emerges.
Welfare analysis puts forward another argument which mitigates the benefits of
raising growth through the increase of the tax rate. Focusing for simplicity on
the model without households’ heterogeneity, we prove that welfare is decreasing
in the labor tax rate. Indeed, even if a higher level of the tax rate promotes eco-
nomic growth, it reduces the initial consumption and above all the population
growth rate: both these effects have a negative impact on households’ welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model.
Section 3 is devoted to the definition of equilibrium. In Section 4, we show
that everybody holds capital along a BGP, while, in Section 5, we study the
existence and uniqueness of the BGP without binding borrowing constraints.
Our results on comparative statics are gathered in Section 6. Finally, we extend
our framework to take into account labor taxation in Section 7. Many proofs
and technical details are relegated in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Dynasties
In the spirit of Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989), we
consider an economy where each person lives for two periods, childhood and
adulthood, and has children at the beginning of his adult period. Parents are
altruistic towards their children, i.e. utility depends on their own consumption,
the number of surviving children and the utility of each child. In addition, we
assume that child’s utility enters linearly that of his parents. Thus, the utility
of an adult of type i belonging to the generation born at t− 1, is given by:
Uit = u (cit) +
[
α (γinit)
−ε
]
γinitUit+1 (1)
cit is the individual consumption giving an instantaneous utility u (cit), while
γinit is the number of surviving children. Indeed, nit is the number of children
per adult, whereas γi ∈ (0, 1] can be interpreted as a surviving probability or
life expectancy:5 the larger γi, the lower the mortality rate. Finally, we notice
that α (γinit)
−ε measures the degree of altruism towards each surviving child,
5We notice that there is no uncertainty and γi denotes the deterministic share of surviving
children. Doepke (2005) observes that introducing uncertainty does not change very much
the properties of the Barro-Becker model.
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with α, ε ∈ (0, 1), and Uit+1 is the utility attained by each surviving child. The
utility function (1) augments the preferences in Becker and Barro (1988) and
Barro and Becker (1989) to take into account a surviving probability.
Throughout this paper, we consider, as in Becker and Barro (1988), an
isoelastic instantaneous utility function, with some parametric restriction to
ensure a well-defined maximization program:
Assumption 1 u (ci) ≡ cσi /σ, with 0 < σ < 1− ε.
To introduce heterogeneity among dynasties, we assume that each generation
is formed by two classes of agents i = 0, 1 who differ for capital endowments
ki0 ≥ 0, child mortality rates γi and cost per child. As shown by Becker and
Barro (1988), the recursive model (1) can be equivalently written as a discrete-
time growth model where the household of type i maximizes a dynastic utility:
Ui =
+∞∑
t=0
αtN1−εit u (cit) (2)
where Ui ≡ N1−εi0 Ui0 and Nit denotes the size of the ith subpopulation at period
t, under the sequence of budget constraints:
cit + γinitkit+1 = Rtkit + (1− βinit)wt (3)
borrowing constraints kit+1 ≥ 0,6 for t = 0, 1, . . ., and given the possibly unequal
distribution of initial capital: k00 6= k10.
The left-hand side of (3) represents the expenditures. Note that kit+1 repre-
sents bequest per surviving child. It is materialized by physical as well as human
capital used for the production at the next period. The borrowing constraints
ensure that bequests can never be negative. Moreover, setting γ0 6= γ1, we take
into account a mortality differential.
The right-hand side of (3) represents the disposable income, where Rt ≡
1− δ+ rt and wt are the gross return on capital and the wage rate, respectively,
with δ ∈ (0, 1) the depreciation rate of capital and rt the real interest rate.
Each households reduces his working time to educate his children. The
opportunity cost of rearing children is given by βinitwt, where βi is the constant
cost per child in units of time. The cost per child is also heterogeneous and
depends on the social class: β0 6= β1. It makes sense to assume that βi is
an increasing function of γi: the better off the family, the higher the survival
probabilities, the larger the time spend with each child. In this respect, we
encompass the affine form considered in Doepke (2005) in a model without
heterogeneity: β = a0 + a1γ, with a0, a1 ≥ 0. The child-rearing cost is the sum
of an initial cost per child (a0) and an adding cost when the child survives (a1).
Time devoted to children cannot exceed the endowment of time per period:
βinit < 1.
6Becker (1980) introduced such borrowing constraints in a Ramsey model with heteroge-
neous households. In contrast to his paper, discount factor are endogenous in our framework,
because of the endogenous fertility.
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Let mit ≡ γinit be the population growth factor of dynasty i. Hence, the
size of a dynasty at time t is given by:
Nit = mit−1Nit−1 = Ni0
t−1∏
s=0
mis (4)
with Ni0 > 0 given.7
Setting dt =
∏t
s=0R
−1
s , with d−1 = 1, allows us to write the budget con-
straint (3) as follows
dtNit+1 (kit+1 + biwt) = Nit [dt−1kit + dt (wt − cit)] (5)
for t = 0, 1, . . ., where bi ≡ βi/γi denotes the cost per surviving child. Instead of
choosing an optimal sequence (cit, kit+1, nit)
+∞
t=0 , the household i can maximize
the utility function (2) with respect to the sequence (cit, kit+1, Nit+1)
+∞
t=0 under
the budget constraints (5) and borrowing constraints kit+1 ≥ 0.
Deriving the infinite-horizon Lagrangian gives:8
α (1− ε)u (cit+1) + αu′ (cit+1) (Rt+1kit+1 + wt+1 − cit+1)
= mεitu
′ (cit) (kit+1 + biwt) (6)
and
mεitu
′ (cit) ≥ αRt+1u′ (cit+1) (7)
jointly with the transversality condition9
lim
t→+∞α
tN1−εit u
′ (cit)mitkit+1 = 0 (8)
The Euler equation (7) holds with equality when household i owns a positive
amount of capital: kit+1 > 0. In this case, substituting (7) in (6), gives
cit+1
[
(1− ε) u (cit+1)
cit+1u′ (cit+1)
− 1
]
= biRt+1wt − wt+1
which writes under Assumption 1:
cit+1 =
σ
1− ε− σ (biRt+1wt − wt+1)
As shown in the Appendix, the second-order conditions for utility maximiza-
tion are also satisfied under Assumption 1.
7Heterogeneous initial population sizes are not excluded: N00 6= N10.
8See the Appendix for more details.
9The implicit price of capital kit+1 is λitdtNit+1 and the transversality condition writes
alternatively limt→+∞ λitdtNitmitkit+1 = 0.
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2.2 Firms
A continuum, of unit size, of identical firms produce the unique final good using
capital Kt and labor Lt. A learning by doing process results in knowledge
accumulation. On the one hand, we assume that there are knowledge spillovers
and that they play as a non-excludible public good, but rival. On the other
hand, we take in account congestion effects, by assuming that the externalities
of knowledge depend on the capital intensity instead of on the aggregate capital.
More explicitly, the quantity produced by one firm is given by Yt = F (Kt, κ¯tLt),
where κ¯t ≡ Kt/Lt denotes the aggregate capital Kt per unit of aggregate labor
Lt and captures the external effect.10 Technology has standard neoclassical
properties:
Assumption 2 Technology is represented by a constant returns to scale produc-
tion function F (X1, X2) with X1 ≡ Kt and X2 ≡ κ¯tLt, defined on [0,+∞)2.
Setting Fi ≡ ∂F/∂Xi and Fij ≡ ∂2F/ (∂Xj∂Xi), we assume that F is C2
on (0,+∞)2, strictly increasing in both arguments (Fi > 0), strictly concave
(Fii < 0, F11F11 − F12F21 > 0). In addition, the boundary (Inada) conditions
limXi→0 Fi (X1, X2) = +∞ are satisfied.
Each firm takes the externalities as constant and maximizes the profit with
respect to (Kt, Lt). Demand for inputs fulfills the first-order conditions: rt =
F1 (Kt, κ¯tLt) and wt = F2 (Kt, κ¯tLt) κ¯t.11
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of our economy is a system of three markets, clearing over
time. Real prices rt and wt adjust to decentralize the equilibrium on the cap-
ital market N0tk0t + N1tk1t = Kt and on the labor market N0t (1− b0m0t) +
N1t (1− b1m1t) = Lt. When these two equalities are fulfilled, the good market
also clears, by Walras law.
Because of firms’ symmetry and the continuum of unit size, individual and
average capital-labor ratios coincide at the equilibrium: κ¯t = κt = Kt/Lt.
We define the total factor productivity A ≡ F (1, 1) and the capital share in
total income s ≡ F1 (1, 1) /F (1, 1). Under constant returns to scale, the Euler
identity applies, i.e. F2(1, 1)/F (1, 1) = 1−s, and the equilibrium prices become:
rt = F1 (1, 1) = sA (9)
wt = F2 (1, 1)κt = (1− s)Aκt (10)
We notice that, as usual in endogenous growth models, the gross interest rate
is constant at equilibrium, i.e. R = 1− δ + sA.
10This specification of externalities has been introduced in the seminal but rarely cited
paper by Frankel (1962). See also Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), chapter 14.
11Under Assumption 2, the second-order conditions for profit maximization are also satisfied.
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Substituting equations (9) and (10) in (3), (6) and (7), and using Assumption
1, we obtain:
cit +mitkit+1 = Rkit + (1− bimit) (1− s)Aκt (11)(
cit+1
cit
)1−σ
=
α
mεit
Rkit+1 + (1− s)Aκt+1 + 1−ε−σσ cit+1
kit+1 + (1− s)Abiκt (12)(
cit+1
cit
)1−σ
≥ α
mεit
R (13)
with
κt =
N0tk0t +N1tk1t
N0t (1− b0m0t) +N1t (1− b1m1t) (14)
and Nit is given by (4).
The balanced growth path (BGP) ensues from considering the dynamic sys-
tem (11)-(13) with a stationary value of the growth factor g.
4 Everybody holds capital along a BGP
In the following, we show that a BGP fails to exist when some borrowing con-
straints are binding.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1-2, there exists no BGP with at least one bind-
ing borrowing constraint.
Proof. Obviously, there exists no BGP when kit = 0 for i = 0, 1. Consider
now that only one type of households holds capital. To fix ideas, assume that
households of type 1 face binding borrowing constraints, while the others do
not. We will prove that k1t = 0 along a BGP leads to a contradiction.
For agents of type 0, system (11)-(13) writes:
m0tk0t+1 = Rk0t + (1− b0m0t) (1− s)Aκt − c0t, for t = 0, 1 . . . (15)
mε0t = αR
(
Rb0 − gt+1
Rb0 − gt gt
)σ−1
, for t = 1, 2 . . . (16)
c0t =
σ
1− ε− σ
(
Rb0
gt
− 1
)
(1− s)Aκt, for t = 1, 2 . . . (17)
where now gt ≡ κt/κt−1 and
κt =
N0tk0t
N0t (1− b0m0t) +N1t (1− b1m1t) (18)
At a steady state gt = gt+1 = g, equation (16) gives
m0 =
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε
(19)
8
which is constant, while (15) and (17) entail
m0g0 = R+ (1− s)A κt
k0t
[
1− b0m0 − σ1− ε− σ
(
b0
R
g
− 1
)]
(20)
where g0 is the stationary value of g0t+1 ≡ k0t+1/k0t. Along the BGP, g0 is
constant and (20) implies that κt/k0t is constant as well, which implies in turn
g = g0.
Therefore, equation (18) gives:
1− b0m0 + (1− b1m1t)N1t/N0t
1− b0m0 + (1− b1m1t+1)N1t+1/N0t+1 = 1
that is
m0 = m1t
1− b1m1t+1
1− b1m1t
since mit = Nit+1/Nit. We deduce that m1t = m1 = m0 is also constant.
For agents of type 1, equation (11) becomes c1t = (1− b1m1t) (1− s)Aκt.
Since m1 constant, we get c1t+1/c1t = g. Equation (13) holds with inequality:(
c1t+1
c1t
)1−σ
>
αR
mε1
i.e. m1 >
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε = m0, which leads to a contradiction with m1 = m0.
5 Growth path when everybody holds capital
Given Lemma 1, we consider that the borrowing constraints are never binding,
i.e. kit > 0 for i = 0, 1 and t = 0, 1, . . .. In this case, the dynamic system
(11)-(13) writes:
mitkit+1 = Rkit + (1− bimit) (1− s)Aκt − cit, for t = 0, 1 . . . (21)
mεit = αR
(
Rbi − gt+1
Rbi − gt gt
)σ−1
, for t = 1, 2 . . . (22)
cit =
σ
1− ε− σ
(
Rbi
gt
− 1
)
(1− s)Aκt, for t = 1, 2 . . . (23)
where we assume bimit < 1 < biR/gt.
Now, we study the stationary growth factor which determines a BGP. Along
the BGP, we have gt = gt+1 = g. Then, equation (22) determines the population
growth factor:
mi =
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε ≡ m (g) (24)
From (4), we have Nit = Ni0mt. Letting µi ≡ Ni0/ (N00 +N10) ∈ (0, 1),
with µ0+µ1 = 1, we define b as the average time cost per surviving child, where:
b ≡ µ0b0 + µ1b1 (25)
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Using (14), the capital-labor ratio rewrites:
κt =
µ0k0t + µ1k1t
1− bm (26)
Along the BGP, we have (kit, cit) = (ki0, ci0) gt and Nit = Ni0mt, with
m = m (g) is given by (24). Replacing these paths in the transversality condition
(8), we obtain:
lim
t→+∞
[
αR1−εg−(1−ε−σ)
]t/ε
mgki0c
σ−1
i0 N
1−ε
i0 = 0
Hence, we deduce the parametric restriction αR1−ε < g1−ε−σ, which simpli-
fies to
R > gm (27)
using (24). We notice that, on a BGP, we have bimi < 1 < biR/gt, which
ensures that the transversality condition (27) is satisfied.
Now, to study the existence and uniqueness of the BGP, we notice that (21)
and (23) imply:
mkit+1 = Rkit + (1− s)Aκt
[
1− bim− σ1− ε− σ
(
bi
R
g
− 1
)]
(28)
Multiplying both the sides of (28) by µi and aggregating over i = 0, 1, we
get:
ω (g, b) ≡ ϕ (g, b)− ψ (g, b) = 0 (29)
where
ϕ (g, b) ≡ [1− bm (g)] [R+ (1− s)A− gm (g)] (30)
ψ (g, b) ≡ (1− s)Aσ
1− ε− σ
(
b
R
g
− 1
)
(31)
and m (g) is given by (24).
A stationary growth path or BGP is a solution g of (29) such that g < Rbi
and bim < 1. The first inequality requires g < g ≡ Rmini bi, while, from (24),
the second one requires g > g ≡ (αRmaxi bεi )1/(1−σ), with g < g for an ap-
propriate choice of α. In this case, since g < g < g implies R > gm, we have
ϕ (g, b) > 0 and ψ (g, b) > 0 for all g ∈ (g, g). By direct inspection of equa-
tions (30) and (31), we immediately see that ∂ψ (g, b) /∂g < 0 < ∂ϕ (g, b) /∂g.
Therefore, there is at most one stationary solution g satisfying (29) provided
that ϕ
(
g, b
)
< ψ
(
g, b
)
and ψ (g, b) < ϕ (g, b).
Without loss of generality, we rank the time costs per surviving child.
Assumption 3 b0 ≤ b1.
In this case, we have g = (αRbε1)
1/(1−σ) and g = Rb0, and inequality g < g
is ensured by an appropriate value of α.
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Assumption 4 α < R−σb1−σ0 b
−ε
1 .
In addition, we find12
ϕ
(
g, b
)
=
1
2
b1 − b0
b1
[
R+ (1− s)A− g
b1
]
and ψ (g, b) =
1
2
b1 − b0
b0
σ (1− s)A
1− ε− σ
Therefore, when there is no heterogeneity in the time cost per surviving child,
i.e. b0 = b1, ϕ
(
g, b
)
= ψ (g, b) = 0. Since ∂ψ (g, b) /∂g < 0 < ∂ϕ (g, b) /∂g, we
have, respectively, ψ
(
g, b
)
> 0 and ϕ (g, b) > 0: this ensures the existence of
a stationary growth factor g. By continuity, a steady state will exist when the
difference between b1 and b0 is not too large. More explicitly, the inequalities
ϕ
(
g, b
)
< ψ
(
g, b
)
and ψ (g, b) < ϕ (g, b), jointly sufficient to the existence of a
BGP, hold under the following condition:
b1 − b0 < 2 min
i
Zi (b, bi) (32)
where
Z0 (b, b0) ≡ 1− ε− σ
σ (1− s)A
[
R+ (1− s)A− (αRε+σbε+σ−10 ) 1ε ][
1− b (αRσbσ−10 ) 1ε ] b0
Z1 (b, b1) ≡ σ (1− s)A1− ε− σ
b
(
αRσbε+σ−11
) 1
σ−1 − b1
R+ (1− s)A− (αRbε+σ−11 ) 11−σ
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-4 and inequality (32), there exists a unique
BGP g satisfying (29).
Since ω (g, b) is increasing in g, the growth rate g − 1 of the capital-labor
ratio is positive if g > 1 and ω (1, b) < 0.
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1-4 and inequality (32), the growth rate of
the capital-labor ratio g − 1 is strictly positive if Rb0 > 1 and
σ
1 + (1− s)A (Rb− 1)[
1− b (αR)1/ε
] [
R+ (1− s)A− (αR)1/ε
]
 > 1− ε
In the Appendix, we analyze the local stability properties of the station-
ary solution g determined in Proposition 1. We show that the BGP is locally
12Under Assumption 3, we have:
R+ (1− s)A− g/b1 > R+ (1− s)A− g/b1
= R+ (1− s)A−Rb0/b1 ≥ (1− s)A > 0
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unique.13 In fact, given the initial population sizes Ni0 and the initial capital
stocks ki0, economy experiences the stationary growth rate from period 1 on
with suitable choices of ci0 and mi0. The lack of transitional dynamics in this
model induces us to focus only on the properties of the BGP and especially
apply the comparative statics (see Section 6).
Eventually, it is not unworthy to notice that both dynasties experience the
same population growth rate along the BGP, equal to m − 1. Even if the
natality factors ni = m/γi differ because of mortality differential, there is no
(net) fertility differential. By direct inspection of (28), we remark that, in
contrast to de la Croix and Doepke (2003), this P structure is in accordance
with individual capital inequality.
6 Comparative statics
In this section, we will focus on the effects on the BGP of demographic or
mortality shocks (through different kinds of variations of the survival rates γ0
and γ1) and productivity shock (through the total factor productivity (TFP)
A). More precisely, we will analyze their role on economic and demographic
growth (g and m respectively) and on natality (ni − 1).
As seen above, in a model without heterogeneous households, Doepke (2005)
assumes a positive relation between the time cost of rearing a child and the
surviving rate of a newborn: βi = a0 + a1γi, with a0 ≥ 0 the cost per child and
a1 ≥ 0 the cost associated to the surviving probability. We deduce that the cost
per surviving child is given by bi = a0/γi + a1. At this stage, it is interesting
to notice that when a0 > 0, it is decreasing and convex in γi, meaning that the
higher the survival probability, the lower the cost per surviving child.
6.1 Effects of mortality shocks
We will consider the effects on the BGP g, the population growth m and the
natality factors ni of various kinds of shocks resulting from changes in the mor-
tality rates or, equivalently, variations in the survival probabilities γi.
By inspection of (29), we see that the key mechanism through which the
survival probability affect the BGP goes through the average cost per surviving
child b. The rationale rests on the quantity-quality trade-off to have children.
Hence, we start by studying how the survival probabilities affect this average
cost b.
We notice that, since bi = a0/γi + a1 and µ0 + µ1 = 1, the average cost b
can write:
b =
[
µ0
1
γ0
+ (1− µ0) 1
γ1
]
a0 + a1 (33)
This expression is appropriate to quantify the effects of γi on b. However,
since we have mortality differential, we are also interested in determining the
13Local uniqueness is analytically proved in the case b0 = b1 and numerically shown in the
case b0 < b1.
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impact of a spread-preserving mean (SPM) and a mean-preserving spread (MPS)
of survival probabilities. To do that, we consider the average:
γA ≡ µ0γ0 + µ1γ1
and we define the spread σA as usual:
σ2A ≡ µ0 (γ0 − γA)2 + µ1 (γ1 − γA)2 = µ0µ1 (γ0 − γ1)2
Without loss of generality, we assume that:
Assumption 5 γ1 < γ0.
Note that, since bi is decreasing in γi, this assumption is in accordance
with b0 < b1 (see Assumption 3). We deduce that σA =
√
µ0µ1 (γ0 − γ1) and,
therefore,
γ1 = γA − σA
√
µ1
µ0
< γ0 = γA + σA
√
µ0
µ1
Substituting these expressions in (33), we get:
b = a0
 µ0
γA + σA
√
µ0
µ1
+
µ1
γA − σA
√
µ1
µ0
+ a1 (34)
A positive shock on SPM corresponds to an increase of γA taking σA as
constant, while a positive shock on MPS to an increase of σA taking γA as
constant.
Using (33) and (34), we obtain a crucial lemma:
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1-5, the average cost per surviving child b is
decreasing in γ0, γ1 and γA, but increasing in σA. Under a0 = 0, these effects
vanish.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma confirms some results for the average cost b already found for b0
and b1. Because of the fixed cost per child a0, increasing the survival probabil-
ities γ0 or γ1, or the average of both will reduce the average cost per surviving
child. This also means that every shock which increases the mortality rates, like
epidemics, will increase the cost per surviving child.
Lemma 2 and the convexity of the cost per surviving child allow us to affirm
that increasing the mortality differential, through a positive shock on σA, raises
the average cost per surviving child. In other words, societies characterized by
more dispersed mortality rates, resulting for instance from a more inegalitarian
access to health services and medical care, face a higher average cost per sur-
viving child. Obviously, all these effects disappear if the fixed cost a0 is zero,
because, in this case, the cost per surviving child becomes independent of the
mortality rates.
Putting together these preliminary results, we can now derive the effects on
the BGP:
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Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-5, the BGP g is increasing in b. It fol-
lows that g is decreasing in γ0, γ1 and γA, but increasing in σA.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The key mechanism through which the survival probabilities affect the BGP
is based on the positive relationship between g and the average cost per surviving
child b. It can be explained by the quantity-quality trade-off faced by households
when they decide the number of children. Indeed, following an increase in the
cost per surviving child, households prefer to improve the quality through the
capital accumulation, which promotes growth. Therefore, according to Lemma
2, every increase in the mortality rates, through a decrease of γ0, γ1 or γA,
as in the case of epidemics, fosters economic growth. Furthermore, because a
larger mortality differential raises the average cost per surviving child, it also
pushes up the growth rate. This suggests that economies facing more unequal
mortality rates will experience higher growth rates. De la Croix and Sommacal
(2009) reached a similar conclusion in a model which takes into account the
progress of medical knowledge, but without endogenous fertility.
We now consider the effects on population growth:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-5, the population growth factor m is de-
creasing in the BGP g. As a consequence, m is increasing in γ0, γ1 and γA, but
decreasing in σA.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As stressed in this proposition, the link between population growth and
mortality rates goes through the negative relationship between the economic
and demographic growth rates. Focus on the Euler equation:(
cit+1
cit
)1−σ
=
α
mεit
R (35)
In fact, since the real interest rate R is constant, a higher growth rate cit+1/cit
has to compensated by a rise of the endogenous discount factor α/mεit, which
implies in turn a decrease of the number of survival children mit. Therefore,
because they increase the average cost per surviving child and economic growth,
higher mortality rates also reduce the population growth factor m. According to
the quantity-quality trade-off of having children, a higher average cost b reduces
the demand for children. This mechanism also explains why increasing mortality
differential pushes down population growth.
The results on the natality rates n0 and n1 are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-5 and a strictly positive fixed cost a0, ni
is increasing in γj. Moreover, ni is decreasing in γi and γA for a0 weak enough.
Finally, n0 is decreasing in σA, whereas n1 is increasing in σA for a sufficiently
low a0.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us observe that, for a fixed cost of child-rearing a0 which is not too
large, the two natality rates move in two opposite directions in response to
a change in one survival probability. To fix ideas, assume that γ0 remains
constant, whereas γ1 decreases, that is the mortality rate of households of type 1
increases (suppose, for instance, that the subpopulation 1 has a limited access to
vaccination services during an epidemics). In this case, the natality rate n0 goes
down because of the quantity-quality trade-off described above. On the contrary,
n1 goes up. Even if the population growth m decreases, households of type 1
make more children to (partially) compensate the lower survival probability
(n1 = m/γ1).
6.2 Effects of the total factor productivity
Focus now on the impact of the TFP A on the BGP. Our findings are summa-
rized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1-5, the BGP g is increasing in the TFP
A if gm > εR. However, the impact of A on the population growth m and the
natality rates n0 and n1 may be positive or negative.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The positive relationship between the TFP A and the growth factor g is
far from trivial because, differently from the basic models of endogenous growth
without endogenous fertility, the growth factor is not directly determined by the
Euler equation. Indeed, the discount factor β of the traditional Euler equation:
g = (βR)1/(1−σ) (36)
is replaced by an endogenous discounting α/mε in our Euler equation:
g =
( α
mε
R
)1/(1−σ)
(37)
In (36), A raises g through the gross interest rate R, while in our model A plays
a role on g and m not only through (37) but also through the other equilibrium
conditions. We derive simple conditions for a positive impact of A on g, while
the effects on m and ni depend on the direct impact of A on R and the indirect
impact on g according to m = γini =
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε.
7 On the role of labor taxation
In the previous section, we have seen how shocks on the mortality rates and the
mortality differential affect the BGP. We have found, for instance, that an econ-
omy with a lower mortality differential is characterized by a lower growth rate.
15
In this section, we introduce a common tax rule and we study its consequences
in terms of economic and demographic growth, social inequalities and welfare.
This allows us to address whenever policy makers of economies characterized
by lower mortality differentials (due, for instance, to a more equal access to
medical services) are recommended to raise or lower their tax rates to enhance
economic growth and, so, reduce the gap with economies characterized by larger
mortality differentials.
The main effects brought out in the comparative statics goes through the
time-cost per surviving child, which also determines leisure. In this respect,
we consider a pertinent choice to introduce taxation on labor income. Many
countries around the world share this fiscal rule. Moreover, for simplicity, we
assume a linear tax rate z ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, the disposable labor income
becomes now (1− z) (1− bimit)wt.
The government spends the fiscal receipts z (1− bimit)wt to finance public
expenditures Gt under the balanced budget rule:
Gt = z (1− b0m0t)wtN0t + z (1− b1m1t)wtN1t
We assume also, for the sake of simplicity, that Gt neither enters the pro-
duction function, nor the consumers’ preferences.
The household of type i still maximizes (2), but faces a new budget constraint
at each period t:
cit +mitkit+1 = Rtkit + (1− z) (1− bimit)wt (38)
or, equivalently,
Nitcit +Nit+1kit+1 = RtNitkit + (1− z) (1− bimit)wtNit (39)
Deriving the Lagrangian function, focussing on equilibria where the borrow-
ing constraints are never binding (kit > 0) and using (9) and (10), we obtain:
mit = (αR)
1
ε
(
cit+1
cit
)σ−1
ε
(40)
cit+1 =
σ (1− z) (1− s)A
1− ε− σ (Rbiκt − κt+1) (41)
Along a BGP, we have gt = gt+1 = g. From (41), we deduce that cit+1/cit =
g. Substituting the balanced growth factor into (40), we obtain, as in the model
without taxation (see (24)):
mi = m =
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε ≡ m (g) (42)
Using (41), equation (38) rewrites:
mkit+1 = Rkit + (1− z) (1− bim) (1− s)Aκt
−σ (1− z) (1− s)A
1− ε− σ (Rbiκt−1 − κt) (43)
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Multiplying by µi, aggregating over i and substituting (42), the BGP is given
by ω (g) = 0, where now:
ω (g) ≡ [R+ (1− z) (1− s)A− gm (g)] [1− bm (g)]
−σ (1− z) (1− s)A
1− ε− σ
(
b
R
g
− 1
)
(44)
The comparative statics on labor taxation starts with the impact of the
tax rate on the economic and demographic growth rates (including the natality
rates).
7.1 The effects of the tax rate on economic and demo-
graphic growth
In order to study the impact of the tax rate z on the economic and demographic
growth g and m, respectively, and on the natality factors ni, let us define:
h (g) ≡ 1− bm (g)
bRg − 1
with h (g) > 0 and h′ (g) > 0. Under Assumption 4, we have g = (αRbε1)
1/(1−σ)
<
g = Rb0 and so, h
(
g
)
< h (g).
Our findings are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1-4, the following holds along the BGP.
Let b0 < b1.
(1) If σ/ (1− ε− σ) < h (g), then ∂g/∂z > 0, ∂m/∂z < 0 and ∂ni/∂z < 0
(i = 0, 1) for all g ∈ (g, g).
(2) If h
(
g
)
< σ/ (1− ε− σ) < h (g), then there exists g∗ ∈ (g, g) such that:
(2.1) ∂g/∂z < 0, ∂m/∂z > 0 and ∂ni/∂z > 0 (i = 0, 1) for all g ∈(
g, g∗
)
;
(2.2) ∂g/∂z > 0, ∂m/∂z < 0 and ∂ni/∂z < 0 (i = 0, 1) for all g ∈ (g∗, g).
(3) If h (g) < σ/ (1− ε− σ), then ∂g/∂z < 0, ∂m/∂z > 0 and ∂ni/∂z > 0
(i = 0, 1) for all g ∈ (g, g).
If b0 = b1, case (2) still applies.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 highlights a non-monotonic effect of the tax rate on economic
growth. The novelty of this result is that it arises in a model where the external-
ities of public good neither enter the production function (as in Barro (1990))
nor the utility function. The public spending Gt just works as a component of
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the aggregate demand and the economic mechanism is very different from the
one found by Barro (1990).
The intuition of Proposition 6 rests on two mechanisms. The first one is
the Euler equation and the negative interplay between g and m: population
dynamics and natality rates move in response to changes in the tax rate z
according to (42). So the endogenous discounting α/mεt adjusts under a constant
gross rate R.
The second mechanism is the individual budget constraint, which writes at
period t:
cit +mit [kit+1 + (1− z) biwt] = Rtkit + (1− z)wt (45)
z has two opposite effects: it lowers the cost of rearing children (1− z) biwt on
the left-hand side (45) and the disposable income on the right hand-side.
When the first effect dominates, an increase of the tax rate decreases the
cost per surviving child. This induces households to have more children, and
has a negative impact on economic growth according to the quantity-quality
trade-off: we are in presence of a prevailing substitution effect.
When the second effect dominates, households reduce the number of children
because of the lower disposable income. This enhances the economic growth be-
cause of the negative interaction between g and m stressed above: the economy
experiences a dominant income effect.
To conclude, we argue that an increase in labor taxation may raise or lower
economic growth depending on the resultant of two classical forces: the substi-
tution effect and the income effect. The mechanism we highlight is very different
from Barro (1990) and goes through the endogenous fertility.
Then, a policy makers who faces a low economic growth (due, for instance,
to a weak mortality differential), should understand what effect prevails before
increasing or decreasing the tax rate on labor income, to avoid any pernicious
impact on the BGP.
7.2 The effects of the tax rate on social inequalities
As seen above, a higher tax rate on labor income may promote economic growth.
This result can be explained on the ground of the quantity-quality trade-off and,
therefore, of capital accumulation. In our model, agents are heterogeneous and
labor taxation has an impact on social inequalities. Since the taxation affects
the economic growth through the capital accumulation, it is suitable to capture
the degree of inequality in terms of wealth, that is of capital distribution.
Governments are not only concerned by a growth performance, but also
by social inequalities. In this respect, it is not unworthy to consider also the
impact of the tax rate on some measure of social inequality, say the Gini index
of wealth distribution, and provide some fiscal policy recommendation to reduce
the degree of inequality.
Ranking the agents h in [0, N0t +N1t] according to their increasing wealth
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and denoting the cumulative wealth by Wt (h), we define the Gini index as:
Gt = 1− 2
∫ N0t+N1t
0
Wt (h) dh
(N0t +N1t)Wt (N0t +N1t)
(46)
In our economy, there are N0t agents holding k0t and N1t agents holding
k1t ≥ k0t.14 Therefore, Wt (h) is given by hk0t, if 0 ≤ h ≤ N0t, and by
N0tk0t + (h−N0t) k1t, if N0t < h ≤ N0t + N1t. Replacing this function in
(46), we obtain a simple formula for the Gini index along the BGP:15
G = µ0
(
1− k0t/κt
1− bm
)
The following expression plays a role in the main proposition:
H ≡ 1− ε− σ
ε
mg
R−mg +
1− σ
ε
(b− b0)m
(1− b0m) (1− bm)
+
σ
1− ε− σ
(1− z) (1− s)A
R− gm
[
b0
R
g
+
(
b0
R
g
− 1
)
b0m
1− b0m
1− σ
ε
]
κt
k0t
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1-4, H is positive and the tax rate z has
two effects on the Gini index evaluated along the BGP:
(1) a direct effect, that is (µ0 −G) / (1− z) > 0, which raises wealth inequali-
ties;
(2) an indirect effect through g, that is (µ0 −G) (H/g) ∂g/∂z, which increases
wealth inequalities if and only if h (g) > σ/ (1− ε− σ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that a higher labor tax rate, which promotes economic
growth, also raises wealth inequalities: so, in the case of a growth-enhancing
labor taxation, we find a positive trade-off between economic growth and in-
equalities. Conversely, when taxation on labor income lowers the economic
performance the trade-off between growth and inequalities is missed.16
7.3 The effects of the tax rate on welfare
We conclude the section on labor taxation by studying the effect of the tax rate
z on social welfare. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that
agents are homogeneous, i.e. b = b0 = b1 and k0t = k1t ≡ kt, whereas N00 and
N10 may differ.
14We obtain this inequality from (43), taking into account that b0 ≤ b1 (see Assumption 3).
15k0t/κt is constant along the BGP.
16The debate about growth and inequalities dates back to the early Nineties, following the
seminal papers on endogenous growth, and renews an older debate about the Kuznets curve.
This issue has been largely discussed in the literature. See Aghion et al. (1999) for a critical
survey.
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Substituting in (2) the paths (kit, cit) = (ki0, ci0) gt and Nit = Ni0mt, and
using the transversality condition, we can compute the utilities along the BGP:
Ui = N1−εi0
R
σ
cσ0
R−mg
where c0 = k0 [(1− z) (1− s)A+R− gm] and m0 = m are the values of the
jump variables which ensure that agents are on the BGP from the beginning.
Given the initial conditions (k0, N00, N10), maximizing the welfare function
W (U0, U1) is equivalent to maximize:17
V ≡ R
σ
[(1− z) (1− s)A+R− gm]σ
R− gm > 0
where g and m are given by ω (g) = 0 and m =
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε. Therefore, the
effect of the tax rate z on welfare is summarized by:
∂V
∂z
=
∂g/∂z
∂g/∂b
∂V
∂b
− σ (1− s)AV
(1− z) (1− s)A+R− gm
with
∂V
∂b
= −1− ε− σ
ε
(1− z) (1− s)A+ (1− σ) (R− gm)
(1− z) (1− s)A+R− gm
gm
R− gm
V
g
∂g
∂b
< 0
Taking in account that ∂g/∂b > 0, we find, surprisingly, that ∂g/∂z > 0, i.e.
h (g) > σ/ (1− ε− σ), implies ∂V/∂z < 0.18
In order to explain this apparent paradox, let us recall that the possibility
of ∂g/∂z > 0 is not excluded (see Proposition 6) even if, in contrast with Barro
(1990), public spending is not productive. The impact of z on V rests on the
interplay of three effects:
(1) a negative direct effect of z on initial consumption,
(2) a positive direct effect of g on future consumption,
(3) a negative indirect effect of g through m (g) on future demography and V ,
because surviving children matter in the utility function.
We know that ∂g/∂z > 0 entails ∂m/∂z < 0. Thus, if ∂g/∂z > 0, the
negative effects on initial consumption (1) and population growth (3) always
dominate the positive effect on future consumption (2). This explains why
welfare decreases in the tax rate (∂V/∂z < 0).
The result still holds by continuity if we introduce a degree of agents’ het-
erogeneity. Hence, under a positive impact of taxation on economic growth, a
benevolent policy maker is recommended to care also about the negative im-
pact on welfare and the positive impact on inequalities, meaning a larger wealth
dispersion (see Proposition 7, point (2)).
17Notice that V = U0 = U1.
18However, the case ∂V/∂z < 0 with ∂g/∂z < 0 cannot be excluded.
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Of course, if the public spending enters either the production function or
the utility function, under a balanced-budget rule, taxation could turn out to
be welfare-improving even in the case of a positive impact on g.
8 Appendix
8.1 First-order conditions for utility maximization
To compute a household’s optimal behavior, we introduce the infinite-horizon
Lagrangian:
Li =
∞∑
t=0
αtN1−εit u (cit)
+
∞∑
t=0
λit [Nit (dt−1kit + dt (wt − cit))− dtNit+1 (kit+1 + wtbi)]
+
∞∑
t=0
µitkit (47)
where λit ≥ 0 and µit ≥ 0 are the multipliers associated to the budget constraint
and the borrowing constraint, respectively.
Maximizing this Lagrangian with respect to cit, kit+1 and Nit+1 gives:
∂Li
∂cit
= αtN1−εit u
′ (cit)− λitNitdt = 0 (48)
∂Li
∂kit+1
= −λitdtNit+1 + λit+1dtNit+1 + µit+1 = 0 (49)
∂Li
∂Nit+1
= (1− ε)αt+1N−εit+1u (cit+1)− λitdt (kit+1 + wtbi)
+λit+1 [dtkit+1 + dt+1 (wt+1 − cit+1)] = 0 (50)
The household’s trade-offs (6) and (7) ensue from these three first order
conditions after elimination of multipliers.
8.2 Second-order conditions for utility maximization
In order to recover the second order-conditions found by Becker and Barro
(1986) in our framework with heterogeneous survival probabilities and borrow-
ing constraints, we consider the Lagrangian function (47).
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The bordered Hessian H5 is given by:
H5 ≡

∂2Li
∂λ2it
∂2Li
∂λit∂µit
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂λit∂µit
∂2Li
∂µ2it
∂2Li
∂µit∂kit
∂2Li
∂µit∂cit
∂2Li
∂µit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂µit∂kit
∂2Li
∂k2it
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂µit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂c2it
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂µit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂N2it

with 
∂2Li
∂λ2it
∂2Li
∂λit∂µit
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂λit∂µit
∂2Li
∂µ2it
∂2Li
∂µit∂kit
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂µit∂kit
∂2Li
∂k2it
∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂µit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂µit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit

=

0 0 Nitdt−1
0 0 1
Nitdt−1 1 0
−dtNit 0 0
dt (wt − cit) + dt−1kit 0 (λit − λit−1) dt−1


∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂µit∂cit
∂2Li
∂µit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂c2it
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂N2it

=

−dtNit dt (wt − cit) + dt−1kit
0 0
0 λitdt−1 − λit−1dt−1
αtN1−εit u
′′ (cit) (1− ε)αtN−εit u′ (cit)− λitdt
(1− ε)αtN−εit u′ (cit)− λitdt −ε (1− ε)αtN−1−εit u (cit)

At the point solution of the maximization program, either (1) the individual
capital is positive (kit > 0) and only one constraint is binding; or (2) the
individual capital is zero (kit = 0) and two constraints are binding.
In the first case, the Hessian matrix becomes four-dimensional:
H4 ≡

∂2Li
∂λ2it
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂k2it
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂c2it
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂N2it

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with 
∂2Li
∂λ2it
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂k2it
∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit

=

0 Nitdt−1
Nitdt−1 0
−dtNit 0
dt (wt − cit) + dt−1kit (λit − λit−1) dt−1


∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂c2it
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂N2it

=

−dtNit dt (wt − cit) + dt−1kit
0 λitdt−1 − λit−1dt−1
αtN1−εit u
′′ (cit) (1− ε)αtN−εit u′ (cit)− λitdt
(1− ε)αtN−εit u′ (cit)− λitdt −ε (1− ε)αtN−1−εit u (cit)

Since we evaluate the Hessian matrix at a point satisfying the first-order
conditions and µt = 0, we have λit = λit−1 and
(1− ε)αtN−εit u′ (cit)− λitdt = −εαtN−εit u′ (cit)
Hence, the bordered Hessian becomes
H4 =

0 Nitdt−1 −dtNit Xt
Nitdt−1 0 0 0
−dtNit 0 αtN1−εit u′′ (cit) −εαtN−εit u′ (cit)
Xt 0 −εαtN−εit u′ (cit) −ε (1− ε)αtN−1−εit u (cit)

with Xt ≡ dt (wt − cit) + dt−1kit.
Negative definition requires (−1)3 detH4 > 0 and (−1)2 detH3 > 0, that is
detH4 < 0 and
detH3 = det
 0 Nitdt−1 −dtNitNitdt−1 0 0
−dtNit 0 αtiN1−εiit u′′ (cit)
 > 0 (51)
Inequality (51) is satisfied, because
detH3 = − (Nitdt−1)2 αtN1−εit u′′ (cit) > 0
Thus, the second-order condition becomes:
det

0 Nitdt−1 −dtNit Xt
Nitdt−1 0 0 0
−dtNit 0 αtN1−εit u′′ (cit) −εαtN−εit u′ (cit)
Xt 0 −εαtN−εit u′ (cit) −ε (1− ε)αtN−1−εit u (cit)
 < 0
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or, equivalently,
−citu
′′ (cit)
u′ (cit)
u (cit)
citu′ (cit)
>
ε
1− ε (52)
Since u (ci) ≡ cσi , we obtain σ < 1− ε, which is satisfied under Assumption
1, as in Becker and Barro (1986).
Case (2) was not considered by Becker and Barro (1986). In this case, H5
becomes
∂2Li
∂λ2it
∂2Li
∂λit∂µit
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂λit∂µit
∂2Li
∂µ2it
∂2Li
∂µit∂kit
∂2Li
∂λit∂kit
∂2Li
∂µit∂kit
∂2Li
∂k2it
∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂µit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂µit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit

=

0 0 Nitdt−1
0 0 1
Nitdt−1 1 0
−dtNit 0 0
Xt 0 −µit/Nit


∂2Li
∂λit∂cit
∂2Li
∂λit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂µit∂cit
∂2Li
∂µit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂kit∂cit
∂2Li
∂kit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂c2it
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂cit∂Nit
∂2Li
∂N2it

=

−dtNit Xt
0 0
0 −µit/Nit
αtN1−εit u
′′ (cit) −εαtN−εit u′ (cit)
−εαtN−εit u′ (cit) −ε (1− ε)αtN−1−εit u (cit)

because now (49) implies −λit−1dt−1 +λitdt−1 = −µit/Nit. Negative definition
requires (−1)3 detH5 > 0, that is detH5 < 0. We notice that
detH5
= −det
 0 −dtNit Xt−dtNit αtN1−εit u′′ (cit) −εαtN−εit u′ (cit)
Xt −εαtN−εit u′ (cit) −ε (1− ε)αtN−1−εit u (cit)

= αtN1−εit u
′′ (cit)X2t − 2dtαtεN1−εit u′ (cit)Xt − d2tαt (1− ε) εN1−εit u (cit)
≡ P (Xt)
Computing the discriminant ∆ of this second order polynomial, we obtain:
∆ = ε
(
2dtαtN1−εit
)2 [
εu′ (cit)
2 + (1− ε)u (cit)u′′ (cit)
]
If ∆ < 0, then detH5 < 0 for all Xt, i.e. the second-order condition for
a local maximum is satisfied. The condition ∆ < 0 is equivalent to (52). As
seen above, since u (ci) ≡ cσi , (52) becomes σ < 1 − ε, which is verified under
Assumption 1.
8.3 Local dynamics when b0 = b1
Before addressing the local stability issue in the more general case of heteroge-
nous costs per surviving child, we focus on the homogeneous case. We start by
computing the reduced dynamic system.
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When b = b0 = b1, equation (22) becomes:
αR
(
Rb− gt+1
Rb− gt gt
)σ−1
= mεit = m
ε
t (53)
where mt ≡ m0t = m1t. Moreover, equation (4) simplifies to Nit ≡ Ni0
t−1∏
s=0
ms
and capital-labor ratio (14) to:
κt =
µ0k0t + µ1k1t
1− bmt (54)
We deduce that (21) rewrites:
mtkit+1 −Rkit =
[
1− bmt + σ1− ε− σ
(
1− bR
gt
)]
(1− s)Aκt (55)
Multiplying both the sides of (55) by µi, aggregating over i = 0, 1 and using
(54), we get:
mtgt+1 (1− bmt+1) = [R+ (1− s)A] (1− bmt) + (1− s)Aσ1− ε− σ
(
1− bR
gt
)
(56)
Equations (53) and (56) form a two-dimensional system, without predeter-
mined variable, which rules the dynamics of the sequence (gt,mt), for t = 1, . . .
Linearizing (53) and (56) around the steady state, given by (24) and (29),
we obtain:
dgt+1
g
= B1
dgt
g
+ (B1 − 1)B4 dmt
mt
(57)
(B0 − 1) dgt+1
g
+B0
dmt+1
m
=
B0 − 1
B0
B1
B1 − 1B3
dgt
g
+ (1 +B2)
dmt
m
(58)
where
B0 ≡ bm ∈ (0, 1) (59)
B1 ≡ bR
g
> 1 (60)
B2 ≡ b (1− s)A
g
> 0 (61)
B3 ≡ B1 −B0 +B2 > 0 (62)
B4 ≡ ε1− σ ∈ (0, 1) (63)
The trace T and the determinant D of the associated Jacobian matrix are
given by:
D =
B1
B0
[
1 +B3
(
1 +B4
1−B0
B0
)]
> 1
T = 1 +
1 +B3
B0
+ (B1 − 1)
(
1 +B4
1−B0
B0
)
> 2
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In addition, we have:
D = T − 1 + (B1 − 1) B3
B0
+
[
(B1 − 1) (1−B4) + B1B3B4
B0
]
1−B0
B0
> T − 1
Inequalities D > T − 1 > 1 entail that the steady state is a source. Since
both the dynamic variables gt and mt are non-predetermined, the equilibrium
is locally unique under rational expectations, i.e. one jumps on the steady state
(24) and (29). We summarize this proof in a proposition.
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions 1-4 and b0 = b1, the equilibrium is locally
unique under rational expectations.
8.4 Local dynamics when b0 < b1
Focus now on the case of heterogenous costs per surviving child. As in the
previous section, we first derive the reduced dynamic system which drives the
dynamics.
We introduce four normalized variables:
ηit ≡ Nit/mt (64)
piit ≡ kit/κt (65)
for i = 0, 1, where m =
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε is the number of surviving children along
the BGP.
Substituting (23) in (21), we find:
mitgt+1piit+1 = Rpiit + (1− s)A
[
1− bimit + σ1− ε− σ
(
1− biR
gt
)]
(66)
Moreover, using (64) and (65), (14) rewrites:
1 =
η0tpi0t + η1tpi1t
η0t (1− b0m0t) + η1t (1− b1m1t) (67)
while (4) gives:
mit = mηit+1/ηit (68)
Substituting (68) in (22), (66) and (67), we get a five-dimensional system
driving the sequence (gt, pi0t, pi1t, η0t, η1t), for t = 1, . . .:(
m
ηit+1
ηit
)ε
= αR
(
Rbi − gt+1
Rbi − gt gt
)σ−1
, for i = 0, 1 (69)
mgt+1piit+1
ηit+1
ηit
= Rpiit + (1− s)A
[
1−mbi ηit+1
ηit
+
σ
1− ε− σ
(
1− biR
gt
)]
,
for i = 0, 1 (70)
1 =
η0tpi0t + η1tpi1t
η0t −mb0η0t+1 + η1t −mb1η1t+1 (71)
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We notice that η0t and η1t inherit the property of predetermined variable
from N0t and N1t, while gt, pi0t, pi1t are independently non-predetermined vari-
ables.
Before analyzing local dynamics, we reexamine the steady state using the
dynamic system (69)-(71). Equation (69) defines m (g) ≡ (αRgσ−1)1/ε, as in
(24), while (70) determines pii as a function of g:
pii (g) = (1− s)A
1− bim (g) + σ1−ε−σ
(
1− bi Rg
)
gm (g)−R , for i = 0, 1
Finally, along the BGP, (71) becomes:
1 =
µ0pi0 (g) + µ1pi1 (g)
1− bm (g) (72)
and gives the stationary growth factor g as a function of the initial population
shares (µ0, µ1).
Linearizing (69)-(71) around the steady state gives:
dgt+1
g
+ (1−B1i)B4 dηit+1
ηi
= B1i
dgt
g
+ (1−B1i)B4 dηit
ηi
(73)
pii
dgt+1
g
+ pii
dpiit+1
pii
+ (pii +B2i)
dηit+1
ηi
=
B1B2iB5
B0
dgt
g
+
piiB1
B0
dpiit
pii
+ (pii +B2i)
dηit
ηi
(74)
for i = 0, 1, and
B60
dη0t+1
η0
+B61
dη1t+1
η1
= − pi0B70
1− pi0
dpi0t
pi0
− pi1B71
1− pi1
dpi1t
pi1
+B70
dη0t
η0
+B71
dη1t
η1
(75)
with
B1i ≡ biR
g
, B2i ≡ bi (1− s)A
g
, B5 ≡ σ1− ε− σ ,
B6i ≡ biηi
b0η0 + b1η1
, B7i ≡ (1− pii) ηi(1− pi0) η0 + (1− pi1) η1
According to the our numerical computations presented below, the associ-
ated Jacobian matrix presents two unit roots and three eigenvalues outside the
unit circle.19 The existence of two unit roots ensues from the persistence of
changes in η0t and η1t and rests on the nature of the BGP which now depends
on the initial conditions, namely those on the shares of population (µ0, µ1) (see
(72)). Initial distributions of population and wealth, jointly with (69)-(71),
uniquely determine the BGP. So, the shape of the BGP is informative about
these initial distributions. This kind of informational persistence results in the
existence of two unit roots.
19Notice that the system is non-hyperbolic and the Hartman-Großman Theorem no longer
applies.
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8.5 Numerical computations for local dynamics when b0 <
b1
Let us set the parameters of the model to fit the empirical features of west-
ern economies during the last decades. We consider 40 years as length of a
period (the adulthood of a generation). We choose for α20 a standard value
for discounting according to the RBC literature: α = 0.2 ≈ 0.99160 (0.99 per
quarter).21 In order to take be compatible with the restriction σ < 1 − ε, we
fix ε = 0.6 and σ = 0.3. The survival probability for a child is set equal to
γ0 = 0.9 for the privileged dynasty and to γ1 = 0.8 for the disadvantaged one.
We set common values a0 = 0.1 and a1 = 0.2 for both the classes: in this case,
the affine form βi = a0 + a1γi introduced by Doepke (2005) fits the evidence on
the opportunity cost of a child in terms of parents’ time endowment found by
Haveman and Wolfe (1995). In the spirit of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992),
we consider that Kt represents a mix of physical and human capital. So, we
accept a value of s = 2/3 for the capital share in total income, while, taking
into account that the human capital depreciates less than the physical one, we
set the average depreciation rate to δ = 0.96, that is about 8% per year (Aghion
and Howitt (1998)). Finally, we calibrate the TFP A = 15.3 to obtain a yearly
growth rate of about 2% which is in line with the value experienced by most of
western countries in the last decades.
According to this parametrization, we obtain the following stationary val-
ues:22 g = 2.2089, m = 1.3102, n0 = 1.4559, n1 = 1.6378, pi0 = 0.5099 and
pi1 = 0.6567 with η0 = 0.9 and η1 = 1.1. We check also the positivity of labor
supplies: 1− β0n0 = 0.5924 and 1− β1n1 = 0.5742 .
Computing the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of system (73)-(75), we
find: x1 = x2 = 1, x3 = 3.1065, x4 = 3.5382, x5 = 5.7407. Thus, there are
two unit roots and three roots outside the unit circle, as seen in the previous
section.
8.6 Proof of Lemma 2
On the one hand, using equation (33), we get:
∂b
∂γ0
= −a0µ0
γ20
≤ 0
∂b
∂γ1
= −a0µ1
γ21
≤ 0
20Note that α represents the discount factor for one surviving child.
21That is an interest rate per year of about 4%.
22For notational parsimony, we show only 4 digits in results, but computations accuracy is
of 16 digits.
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On the other hand, using (34), we obtain:
∂b
∂γA
= −a0
(
µ0
γ20
+
µ1
γ21
)
≤ 0
∂b
∂σA
= a0
√
µ0µ1
(
1
γ21
− 1
γ20
)
≥ 0
because γ1 < γ0.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 2
The BGP g is determined by equation (29) and we obtain, with some notational
misuse:
∂g
∂b
=
g
b
bR/g−bm
1−bm
bRg +
(
bRg − 1
)
bm
1−bm
1−σ
ε +m
1−bm
(1−s)A/g
(1−ε−σ)2
εσ
> 0
Then, using Lemma 2, we find:
∂g
∂γ0
=
∂g
∂b
∂b
∂γ0
< 0 and
∂g
∂γ1
=
∂g
∂b
∂b
∂γ1
< 0
In addition, we have
∂g
∂γA
= −a0
(
µ0
γ20
+
µ1
γ21
)
∂g
∂b
< 0 and
∂g
∂σA
= a0
√
µ0µ1
(
1
γ21
− 1
γ20
)
∂g
∂b
> 0
8.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating m =
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε (see (24)), we obtain:
∂m
∂b
= −1− σ
ε
m
g
∂g
∂b
Applying Lemma 2, we find the following results:
∂m
∂γi
=
∂m
∂b
∂b
∂γi
= −1− σ
ε
m
g
∂g
∂b
∂b
∂γi
= a0
1− σ
ε
µi
γ2i
m
g
∂g
∂b
> 0
∂m
∂γA
=
∂m
∂b
∂b
∂γA
= a0
1− σ
ε
(
µ0
γ20
+
µ1
γ21
)
m
g
∂g
∂b
> 0
∂m
∂σA
=
∂m
∂b
∂b
∂σA
= a0
√
µ0µ1
1− σ
ε
(
1
γ20
− 1
γ21
)
m
g
∂g
∂b
< 0
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8.9 Proof of Proposition 4
Using ni = m/γi, we obtain:
∂ni
∂γi
=
1
γi
∂m
∂γi
− m
γ2i
=
m
γ2i
(
a0
1− σ
ε
µi
γi
1
g
∂g
∂b
− 1
)
∂ni
∂γj
=
1
γi
∂m
∂γj
= a0
1− σ
ε
1
γi
µj
γ2j
m
g
∂g
∂b
Since db/dg > 0, we deduce that ∂ni/∂γj > 0 for a strictly positive a0 and
∂ni/∂γi < 0 for a sufficiently weak a0.
Using
γ1 = γA − σA
√
µ1
µ0
< γ0 = γA + σA
√
µ0
µ1
we get:
∂γi
∂γA
= 1,
∂γ0
∂σA
=
√
µ0
µ1
,
∂γ1
∂σA
= −
√
µ1
µ0
and, eventually,
∂ni
∂γA
=
∂ni
∂m
∂m
∂γA
+
∂ni
∂γi
∂γi
∂γA
=
1
γi
∂m
∂γA
− m
γ2i
∂γi
∂γA
=
1− σ
ε
a0
γi
(
µ0
γ20
+
µ1
γ21
)
m
g
∂g
∂b
− m
γ2i
which implies that ∂ni/∂γA < 0 for a sufficiently weak a0.
Finally, we compute:
∂ni
∂σA
=
∂ni
∂m
∂m
∂σA
+
∂ni
∂γi
∂γi
∂σA
=
1
γi
∂m
∂σA
− m
γ2i
∂γi
∂σA
which gives, more explicitly,
∂n0
∂σA
=
1
γ0
a0
√
µ0µ1
1− σ
ε
(
1
γ20
− 1
γ21
)
m
g
∂g
∂b
− m
γ20
√
µ0
µ1
∂n1
∂σA
=
1
γ1
a0
√
µ0µ1
1− σ
ε
(
1
γ20
− 1
γ21
)
m
g
∂g
∂b
+
m
γ21
√
µ1
µ0
It ensues that ∂n0/∂σA < 0, whereas ∂n1/∂σA > 0 for a sufficiently low a0.
8.10 Proof of Proposition 5
We notice that A affects R = 1 − δ + sA and therefore m (see equation (24)),
but has no impact on the average cost b. With some notational misuse, the
BGP satisfies:
R− gm (g,R) = (1− s)A
[
σ
1− ε− σ
bRg − 1
1− bm (g,R) − 1
]
(76)
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with m ≡ m (g,R) = (αRgσ−1)1/ε. Differentiating (76) with respect to A and
g, we obtain:
A
g
dg
dA
=
[
sA
R
bRg +(bRg −1) bm1−bm 1ε
1−bm +
bRg −1
1−bm − 1−ε−σσ
]
+ 1−ε−σεσ
s
1−s
gm−εR
R
bRg +(bRg −1) bm1−bm 1−σε
1−bm +
(1−ε−σ)2
εσ
gm
(1−s)A
Transversality condition along the BGP writes R > gm (g,R). Hence, equa-
tion (76) implies:
bRg − 1
1− bm >
1− ε− σ
σ
Therefore, a sufficient condition to have dg/dA > 0 is gm > εR.
Still using m =
(
αRgσ−1
)1/ε, we find:
A
m
∂m
∂A
=
1
ε
sA
R
− 1− σ
ε
A
g
dg
dA
=
1
ε
sA
R
− 1− σ
ε
[
sA
R
bRg +(bRg −1) bm1−bm 1ε
1−bm +
bRg −1
1−bm − 1−ε−σσ
]
+ 1−ε−σεσ
s
1−s
gm−εR
R
bRg +(bRg −1) bm1−bm 1−σε
1−bm +
(1−ε−σ)2
εσ
gm
(1−s)A
The impact of A on m can be positive or negative. Since
A
ni
∂ni
∂A
=
A
m
∂m
∂A
the same conclusion holds for n0 and n1.
8.11 Proof of Proposition 6
Deriving (44) with respect to z and g, we obtain:
∂ω
∂z
= (1− s)A
[(
b
R
g
− 1
)
σ
1− ε− σ + bm− 1
]
∂ω
∂g
= m
(
(1− bm) 1− ε− σ
ε
+
[
b
R+ (1− z) (1− s)A
g
− bm
]
1− σ
ε
)
+b
R
g
(1− z) (1− s)A
g
σ
1− ε− σ
We notice that ∂ω/∂g > 0, while ∂ω/∂z > 0 if and only if h (g) < σ/ (1− ε− σ).
Hence,
∂g
∂z
= −∂ω/∂z
∂ω/∂g
< 0 if and only if h (g) <
σ
1− ε− σ
Under b0 < b1 and Assumption 4, we have 0 < h
(
g
)
< h (g). Therefore,
(1) if σ/ (1− ε− σ) < h (g), then σ/ (1− ε− σ) < h (g) for all g ∈ (g, g),
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which implies ∂g/∂z > 0. (2) If h
(
g
)
< σ/ (1− ε− σ) < h (g), then there
exists g∗ ∈ (g, g) such that (2.1) h (g) < σ/ (1− ε− σ), that is ∂g/∂z < 0,
for all g ∈ (g, g∗) and (2.2) σ/ (1− ε− σ) < h (g), that is ∂g/∂z > 0, for all
g ∈ (g∗, g). (3) If h (g) < σ/ (1− ε− σ), then h (g) < σ/ (1− ε− σ), that is
∂g/∂z < 0, for all g ∈ (g, g).
Since
∂m
∂z
= −1− σ
ε
m
g
∂g
∂z
and
∂ni
∂z
= − 1
γi
1− σ
ε
m
g
∂g
∂z
we have that ∂m/∂z > 0 or ∂ni/∂z > 0 if and only if ∂g/∂z < 0.
Without heterogeneity b0 = b1 = b and
0 = h
(
g
)
<
σ
1− σ − ε < h (g) = +∞
Therefore, case (2) still applies.
8.12 Proof of Proposition 7
From (43), we have, along the BGP,
k0t/κt
1− bm =
(1− z) (1− s)A
R− gm
1− b0m
1− bm
(
σ
1− ε− σ
b0
R
g − 1
1− b0m − 1
)
Using this expression, we are able to compute the derivative ofG with respect
to z as follows:
∂G
∂z
= (µ0 −G)
(
1
1− z +
H
g
∂g
∂z
)
where µ0 > G and H > 0. The proposition immediately follows.
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